However, the rebels suspended a threat to resume fighting, and gave West African diplomats a chance to pressure President Laurent Gbabo into allowing an interim prime minister, Seydou Diarra, to form a government that would include them. Watching from exile in Paris was former Ivorian Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, 60, one of those who helped negotiate a peace deal in January. He leads the Rally for Republicans, considered Ivory Coast’s leading political party. Trained as an economist, he served as his country’s prime minister from 1990 to 1993. He announced his candidacy for president in elections scheduled for 2000, but was barred from the contest on grounds that his mother was not Ivorian. He fled the country amid pre-election violence in December, 1999, and his followers boycotted the poll, which brought President Laurent Gbagbo power. Ouattara formally was granted Ivorian nationality in 2001 and returned to Abidjan to a tumultuous welcome. He took refuge in the French embassy during a failed army revolt last September that led to the occupation of the country’s north and west by three rebel groups. A French delegation shepherded him back to Paris two months later. Some 3,000 French troops now enforce a ceasefire among the warring parties. Ouattara spoke by telephone with NEWSWEEK’s Tom Masland. Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK: What is holding up the peace deal?
Alassane Ouattara: President [Laurent] Gbagbo must do what is provided in the accord and transfer executive power to Mr. Diarra. He should delegate executive power. We have agreed on the portfolios, and we have given him the names, so this should be easy to do.
The sticking point seems to be the defense and interior ministries, which the rebels demand.
This was decided in Paris. Each of us gave his agreement to this arrangement. The French government and the international committee should ask President Gbagbo to sign a decree granting executive power to the interim prime minister, and then Mr. Diarra can form a government without any difficulty. He gave a speech to say he would fully implement the agreement. The international community should remind him that this was the deal.
But how can the president agree, given the popular unrest that followed announcement of the Paris agreement?
The unrest was organized by Gbagbo and everybody knows it. This was pure manipulation. People were bused in and given money to come, and were threatened that if they didn’t participate their houses would be burned down. People were pouring into Abidjan from all over the southern part of the country.
If this agreement is not implemented, what are the prospects for a peaceful political transition?
Slight. Remember, this was a compromise. The majority of us wanted Gbagbo to be deposed because he is completely illegitimate. The little legitimacy he had, he has lost with gross violations of human rights. Everybody knows that there was no election–it came from the streets and from a group of gendarmes. The majority of us in Paris wanted the constitution to be suspended. My party in particular thought that the national assembly is not representative-as the foremost party, we were not able to participate in the parliamentary election. The only way to get out of this crisis situation is to implement the accord.
Are you now free to run for the presidency?
Yes, assuming the provisions of the agreement are implemented through a fair judicial system. The problem was we did not have a fair judicial system. They went as far as to say my mother was not my mother, in spite of the DNA test I provided. An overhaul of the judicial system is critical. We need a full overhaul of the institutions of the country, including the media.
What caused a once-prosperous country to fall so far?
It is because of policies of apartheid and discrimination that we have these difficulties. The law says that anyone born in Cote D’Ivoire after August 7, 1960, is Ivorian, but this has not been applied. The judiciary is the fundamental problem. You have hundreds of thousands–maybe millions–of people who have never been given their rights. This has big implications for the ownership of land. This is especially serious concerning Burkina Faso, which once was part of the same country. There are three million Burkinabe who are not considered citizens of Cote D’Ivoire.
What will it take for you to go back to Abidjan?
Security, security, security. We hope that the international courts will act to try and punish all those guilty of human rights violations and killing. Once there is security for the population as a whole, political leaders can go back.
You have been exiled before.
Yes, this is the third time. As the French say, never two without three.
Does France’s military intervention in Ivory Coast complicate its efforts to oppose U.S. policy toward Iraq?
That is a matter of high-level diplomacy. It clearly is quite a challenge for France to disengage from this conflict. About 15,000 French people are in Ivory Coast. This is an important test for the new government. For the prestige and credibility of French policy in Africa, they have to win the case of Cote D’Ivoire. The main issue is what will happen now. We believe pressure will be put or should be put on President Gbagbo to abide by his word.
If he doesn’t do that what happens?
That’s the question we ask. Clearly the U.N. Security Council should come into the game. The Ivorian people have suffered a lot from five months of conflict. The north has been deprived of all types of food, cash, medication. This cannot last much longer.
Terrorism and the Iraq crisis have highlighted conflicts between Muslims and others worldwide. Is this at the root of the Ivory Coast conflict as well?
Everybody knows that this is not a religious conflict. Cote D’Ivoire is known as a very moderate Muslim community. Even in the south, the Muslims are in the majority. The conflict turned ethnic because President Gbagbo put people from his tribe into the armed forces, and turned out others. Many of the rebel officers are not Muslim, and are not from the north. The head of the main rebel group is a former seminarian.
