NEWSWEEK: What are the basic elements of the current threat?
Jean-Louis Bruguiere: Al Qaeda’s determination to continue the fight is intact, even reinforced. But it’s not simply Al Qaeda that poses a threat, it’s a veritable radical Islamist movement which shares the Al Qaeda strategy. They are everywhere, these networks.
What’s the significance of the brief audio message released by Osama bin Laden last week?
First, there was a great debate whether it was bin Laden or not. I can’t make any pronouncement on that. But the problem of authenticity is not a fundamental element of the threat. That is much greater than any one man, it goes well beyond. The new strategy is to utilize the media to transmit messages of fear, of terror, that can weigh directly on the global economy, on the markets, on confidence. This amplifies the effects of classic terrorism [ie., the violence itself]. We’re talking about their ‘management’ of terror. And this type of threat is of course of such a nature to mobilize others to strike wherever and whatever they choose. It may also be important that the message comes at the end of the year, a period traditionally of great fragility for us, and great danger, aimed at the great symbols of the Christian holidays. Remember there were attempts to carry out attacks in the United States in December 1999, and in Strasbourg [France] in 2000.
Is there a link to Iraq?
I don’t think so. We have not found any relevant connection or links between Iraq and Islamist networks. But Al Qaeda unquestionably is looking to globalize the conflict with the West, and will pick up on all those situations where Muslims may find themselves in confrontation with Jews or Christians. The will–or the wish–of Al Qaeda is to create a real schism between Muslims and non-Muslims. We are not in fact in a clash of civilizations, but that is what Al Qaeda wants.
Who participates in this broader “Islamist movement”?
In Europe and Canada it is practically entirely North African–Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian. These people are not very organized. They don’t have a well-developed structure. But nevertheless they have a strong capacity to carry out terrorist acts.
Such groups couldn’t carry out another spectacle like September 11, could they?
There are operations which I would call ‘heavy,’ which are directed by the Al Qaeda leadership, and which are most likely to take place outside Europe. An example would be the bombing in Bali. But inside Europe, such operations are much more difficult to carry out. This doesn’t mean it’s impossible. But it’s more difficult, and in this case would be carried out by European cells.
You talked of a grand strategy of the Islamist movement, and yet you seem to suggest that bin Laden himself isn’t too important. Doesn’t a grand strategy imply a grand strategist?
There’s no doubt bin Laden has played a major role. But he is not, himself, the be-all and end-all threat. We are up against terrorism of a different type that’s carried forward by references to doctrine. All of those who adhere to this ideology may organize themselves to put it into action without orders or predetermined criteria. So there’s not an operational scheme as such. And as a result these little groups are going to function autonomously, with just a few contacts with superior authorities or institutions. There is no structure as such, no general staff.
So where do bin Laden’s exhortations fit into the picture?
The intent is to destabilize, to weaken the adversary, to incite others to act without necessarily specifying targets or means. This is the problem. The threats cannot just be fit into set parameters on someone’s computer, the number of variables is too high.
How do you fight such a threat?
You have to do what we do all the time. You have to be aware, and you have to be flexible. It’s always morphing, it’s always mutating, a little like a virus. You think you have it nailed and then it changes form. And governments have not done all that’s necessary to react effectively, especially when it comes to law enforcement. In France we have worked for years on these terrorist cells in order to destroy them. We have used the laws against conspiracy to attack the logistical networks. Without logistics you can’t conduct a war. So we have attacked those trafficking in false passports, those financing, those possessing explosives. Without the logistics the terrorists can’t act. So that’s been our priority. [But] if we want to fight this war, we should improve the level of international cooperation. The threat demands a global response, and that has to be better than it has been.
